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ABSTRACT

Major League Soccer is in a transitional state which may see it projected into the realm
of international relevancy, competing with European soccer. This transition is fueled by
contracting renowned superstars from Europe via the designated player (DP) rule. This
study examines implications of the DP rule on competitive balance (CB) of the league
and wage dispersion among teams. The effect of the rule on CB is inconclusive in the
model constructed, but propositions of a more appropriate CB measure are presented for
future research. The DP rule has caused higher levels of salary dispersion within the
league and this dispersion is found to be negatively related to team performance which is
supportive of the wage compression hypothesis.
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Introduction
Why Sports?
Professional sports provide Economists with regulated and controlled
experiments. “Thus, sports provide the ultimate avenue for examining business and
management practices: owing to data availability, on the one hand, and the high degree
of competition in the industry, on the other” (Frick, Prinz and Winkelmann, 2003, p.
473). Performance of players is observable and precisely measured. Payoffs are large,
incentivizing players to behave rationally and efficiently, and these players are in the far
right tail of the talent distribution. Research in the Sporting industry can be used to
support Economic theory. An analysis of penalty kicks gave support to the Nash mixedstrategy equilibria, when laboratory experiments had failed to do so (Chiappori, Levitt
and Groseclose 2002).
Why MLS?
MLS is unique in comparison to other Professional sporting leagues because of its
top-down managerial structure. MLS is a single entity sporting league, meaning player
contracts and all teams are owned by the league. There are shareholders within the
organization and some of these shareholders are appointed as investor-operators, acting
as team “owners”. The single entity structure acts as a cost control and hedges against
risks. Today, there are 19 investor-operators for 20 teams with most of the operators
being companies such as Hunts Sports and AEG.
MLS has begun slowly hiring superstars from European soccer leagues in order to
increase revenues and fan interest via the designated player rule. This rule is unique in
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the sporting industry. The salary cap rule in MLS makes it similar to the structural
makeup of other American sporting leagues, but the designated player rule allows the
league to merge its structure with that of a non-restricted wage system in European soccer
leagues. The lack of wage restrictions in European soccer causes high wage bills and low
profit margins. European football clubs like Real Madrid, Barcelona, and Manchester
United (top three valued sporting clubs in the world) have some of the highest revenues
and valuations, but lag behind American clubs in profits.
MLS is trying to find a happy medium between the structural makeup of
American leagues and European soccer leagues with the hopes of competing with the
NBA, NFL, MLB, and international soccer leagues. The uniqueness of the designated
player rule and single entity structure makes MLS an enticing field of research for Sports
Economists.
A Brief History of Major League Soccer
In 1994 the United States hosted, arguably, the most important sporting event in
the world, the World Cup. The anticipation of the event lead to an increased interest in
the sport, and the US decided it would implement a league which fell under the standards
of FIFA. The league would be called Major League Soccer, and began its first season in
1996. The 1994 World Cup was a massive success, with an average attendance of
69,000, which is a record for highest average attendance during a World Cup. (Fifa
World Cup competition records 2013) This feat is amazing considering countries-Brazil,
Germany, and France- which have hosted the World Cup since 1994.
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Alan Rotherberg was the president of the U.S. Soccer Federation at the time of the
1994 World Cup and was backed by FIFA to an extent that FIFA threatened to take away
the World Cup from the US if Alan was not the president. After the World Cup, Alan
began devising a plan for a professional soccer league in the US. He hired Mark Abbot
and together they began devising a business plan for the league. (Dure 2010, 3) Once the
league was approved they acquired an office in Los Angeles. Ivan Gazidis, was hired by
Mark Abbot and describes the state of the office when he arrived:
So I arrived in this place that had no windows and asked to be shown to
my office, and there was no office. Mark was in a fire closet, literally.
There was a banner that said Major League Soccer; nobody knew what
that was. I had a desk in the corridor of the main thoroughfare. I didn’t
have a telephone or a computer, and that’s how I started. (Dure 2010, 10)
The league began with 10 teams divided up into two conferences. The first match
was held in San Jose, California between the San Jose Clash and D.C. United and was
broadcasted on ESPN with 31,000 fans in attendance. The first season had great
attendance numbers which would decline the following year. MLS lost an estimated $250
million in its first five years (Eligon 2005). The league’s first of many expansions came
in 1998 with the additions of the Miami Fusion and the Chicago Fire.
The United States advanced to the quarterfinals in the 2002 World Cup which
sparked a renewed interest in the sport. The league began to pursue financial stability in
the form of soccer specific stadiums. There were six stadiums built between 2003 and
2008. In 2005, the league expanded once more with the additions of Real Salt Lake and
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Chivas USA. The league would proceed to slowly expand with the addition of 8 more
teams between 2007 and 2015.
One of the major turning points for MLS was when the Designated Player (DP)
rule was introduced. The DP rule allowed teams to bring in star players which required
high salaries without counting against the salary cap. Teams were only allowed one DP,
and could trade their DP roster spot to another team, allowing for a maximum of two
DP’s per team. The rule changed in 2010 when it allowed teams to have two DP’s, but
teams could not trade any of these roster spots to other teams. David Beckham was the
first major player to which this rule applied and sparked an influx of stars such as Thierry
Henry and Juan Pablo Angel. David Beckham began playing for the LA Galaxy in 2007
and changed the outlook of MLS. Beckham wasn’t only a great soccer player, but an
international celebrity. We now see an increase in superstar additions with the recent
signings of Kaka, David Villa, and Frank Lampard. There were 5 DP’s in 2007 and 27
DP’s for the 2014 season. One interesting aspect of the DP rule is how the salary of DP’s
are paid. The league pays the amount which the DP counts towards the salary cap and
the team pays the amount of the salary above this level.
Demand for Soccer in the US
The DP rule is a tool for increasing the demand for MLS and sustaining steady
growth. The research of this paper does not directly analyze demand curves for MLS, but
understanding the steps involved in increasing demand is important. The first step in
growing MLS and having a sustainable future lies in increasing the demand for the sport
of soccer. The sport is at a crutch compared to the NFL, MLB, NBA, and NHL. The
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sport is often ridiculed by Americans for being boring and for low scoring games.
Americans must appreciate the sport and the tactics which fuel its competitiveness. The
best way for Americans to better understand the sport is to participate in it. Soccer
participation by kids entering their athletic years, around the age of 6, is usually pretty
high, but these kids generally move on to other sports like football, basketball, or
baseball. What about these kids that leave soccer after their younger years and
participate in other American sports? How will they become interested in the tactics and
beauty of soccer?
Video games allow kids and adults to compete in different sports without having
to incur the costs of participating in recreational or competitive soccer leagues. FIFA is
the leading soccer video game across the world and individuals competing in a virtual
world of soccer can provide interest for watching soccer. The emergence of FIFA, the
video game, could arguably play a major part in getting Americans to appreciate the
sport. Kurt Badenhausen of Forbes Magazine shares the same view, he writes:
A 2012 ESPN Sports Poll found that soccer was the second
most popular sport for those ages 12-24. FIFA video games
were cited as a driving factor for the sport’s popularity
among the younger generation in the study. The age group
overlaps nicely with FIFA’s core audience which is 16-32,
according to Nick Channon, a senior producer of the game
at EA. These are the people that are fueling the interest in
the sport and the nucleus of World Cup viewing parties. A
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recent survey of Americans by the Pew Research Center
found that 24% of those 18-29 had a strong interest in the
World Cup (Badenhausen 2014).
Figure 1

Year
FIFA 14
FIFA 13
FIFA 12
FIFA 11
FIFA 10
FIFA 09
FIFA 08
FIFA 07
FIFA 06

North American
Sales
%
(Millions of Units) increase
2.61
5.24%
2.48
24.62%
1.99
4.74%
1.9
0.00%
1.9
-2.06%
1.94
-0.51%
1.95
26.62%
1.54
4.05%
1.48

Figure 1 shows a substantial growth in the demand for FIFA from 2006-2014 (Game
Database: FIFA n.d.).
One might assume that as long as the demand for FIFA is on the rise, then the
demand for watching soccer will be on the rise, but there still lies an issue in how this
will effect MLS. When people play FIFA, they are generally not picking MLS teams
because the superstars of the sport play mostly in European leagues. Gamers choose to
play with top clubs in Europe such as Manchester United, Chelsea, Barcelona, Real
Madrid, etc. FIFA creates an interest in European soccer more so than MLS. This is
where the DP rule comes into play and hence, lies its importance concerning the league’s
growth. By slowly increasing the number of superstars in the league, fans at the margin
will begin watching MLS more. The DP rule allows a slow and steady induction of
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superstars. League shareholders want the induction to be slow and steady because they
want to avoid imitating the collapse of the National American Soccer League (NASL) in
1985.
The NASL began in 1968 and saw a large increase in demand during the mid1970’s. The league began acquiring superstars at a high rate, one being Pele, arguably
the best soccer player of all time. The NASL experienced financial troubles due to overexpansion and economic recession. There was a sharp decrease in demand for the NASL
and the revenues could not support the high wage bills. The NASL suspended operations
just before the 1985 season.
The DP rule puts a restriction on the number of superstars which each team may
possess and this allows a slow and steady induction of superstars. The DP rule is a tool
placing MLS on a path to international relevance. The research conducted in this paper is
focused on understanding how the DP rule may affect important aspects of Major League
Soccer, specifically competitive balance and team performance.
Previous Research on Competitive Balance
Competitive Balance (CB) is an important issue concerning sports. It is important
to obtain the best measure for CB and know what other variables have an effect on it.
When a league experiences higher levels of CB, then there is more uncertainty of the
outcome of matches and championship titles. When there is more uncertainty, fans
become more interested and attend/view games more often. This positive effect on
demand will cause an increase in revenues for a given sporting league. There has been
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no research conducted on CB for Major League Soccer, but studies of CB in other
sporting leagues have been done.
Simon Rottenberg(1956) was the first to address and measure competitive
balance. Rottenberg addressed the reserve clause in Major League Baseball, a rule which
prohibited baseball players’ free movement in the labor market. The reserve clause
caused monopsony rents on players because they could not negotiate with other teams in
the league concerning their contract. Once a player is drafted by a team, the team has
complete control over the player and the player can transfer only with permission of its
current team. The rule was defended by representatives of the league because it
maintained parity by not enabling richer clubs to attract the best talent with high salaries.
Rottenberg attacks this claim of parity caused by the reserve clause. He uses a
between-season competitive balance measure by analyzing pennants won from 19201951. The New York Yankees won the American League Pennant 18 times. In the
National League, the St. Louis Cardinals won 9 times, the New York Giants won 8 times,
and the Philadelphia Phillies and Boston Braves each earned 1 title. Rottenberg
concludes that the reserve clause is not a vehicle for maintaining parity. The wealthier
teams were able to put their resources into farm teams and offering high prices for
players under contract. All the while, players have no rule over their future or the
salaries. The reserve clause was removed in 1976.
Craig Depken (1999) addresses whether the removal of the reserve clause in 1976
had an effect on CB in Major League Baseball. He uses an adjusted HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI). His findings suggest the removal of the reserve clause
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statistically decreased parity in the American League, while there is no statistically
significant effect in the National League.
Ross Booth (2005) analyzed competitive balance (CB) for three Australian Sports
Leagues: the Australian Football League, the National Basketball League, and the
National Rugby League. He addresses whether the introduction of a salary cap and a
player draft improves CB. Booth uses a within-season CB measure: the actual standard
deviation/idealized standard deviation (ASD/ISD) ratio and a between-season measure:
the distribution of premierships (championships). CB is measured for the 1970-2004
seasons with emphasis on the 1985 additions of a salary cap and player draft. All three
leagues experienced a decrease in CB, suggesting the rules worsened parity, but the
leagues saw expansions into large markets post 1985, which he believes negatively
affected CB. Booth is not convinced that salary cap and player draft rules negatively
affect CB due to the simultaneous effect of expansion. Booth does not use regression
analysis but merely analyzes the measures over time. His study would be more complete
and the partial effects of salary caps, player drafts, and league expansion would be more
discernible if regression analysis was used.
Andrew Larsen (2006) addresses the impact of free agency and the salary cap on
CB in the National Football League. Larsen adopts Depken’s HHI measure to analyze
CB over the 1970-2002 seasons. Larsen uses a regression model with the HHI measure
as the dependent variable. Larsen’s findings suggests free agency and salary caps
improve CB, while an increase in schedule length and the number of playoff spots
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decreases CB. Teams building new stadiums also decreased CB. All these variables
were found significant at the 10% level.
Distribution of Points
In soccer, success isn’t measured simply by winning or losing, draws are allowed
and are an important part of the game. There is a point system in soccer with three points
being awarded to the winning team and 0 points for the losing team. If there is a draw
(tie), then both teams are awarded 1 point. Teams are then ranked based on point totals
instead of win totals. The point system is a concept which most Americans don’t
understand due to the fact American sports are based off of winning or losing, barring the
extremely rare cases of a tie in the NFL 1. Analyzing the distribution of the points for a
given season can allow for an understanding of levels of competitive balance within the
league. Points obtained by each team can be found in Wikipedia entries for each MLS
season.
Measuring Competitive Balance with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
In order to measure competitive balance Depken (1999) and Larsen (2006) use a
form of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for MLB and the NFL. Before Depken,
the most common way to measure within-season CB was using the standard deviation of
wins. Standard deviation of wins and HHI are related, in a non-linear way, which will be

1

Ties are very much frowned upon by Americans and MLS tried to accommodate their customers and
viewing population by having a penalty shootout at the end of games in which the score was level. The
team which wins the penalty shootout would receive 1 point with the loser receiving 0. This shootout rule
was abandoned in 2000 and MLS conformed to the rest of the soccer world by allowing both teams to
receive a point in the case of a draw.
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explained in this section. Depken claims that HHI allows us to control for exogenous
factors that influence the competitive nature of MLB.
The HHI is a measure used in industry to understand the concentration of market
shares. It is calculated as follows:

Where

equals the market share of each firm with n number of firms in the industry.

The HHI is used to evaluate mergers and stands as a measure of competition. The
squaring of each company’s market share gives more weight to large companies. The
index has a lower bound of 0, the case with many companies all having small market
shares. The upper bound of the index is 1, as would be the case with one company in the
industry which holds a monopoly. Therefore, a larger HHI is represented by a decrease
in competition and vice versa.
In order to use the HHI as a measure of parity within sports leagues, Depken
(1999) and Larsen (2006) allow the market shares to be represented by a team’s wins
divided by total wins by all teams within the league for that year. In the case for soccer
we can’t use wins because of the point system aforementioned. Therefore, the HHI used
for this paper is as follows:

where

equals the points accumulated for the given season by each team with n teams.

Depken and Larsen note that the lower bound of the HHI is 1/n, a case of perfect parity.
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Sports leagues may expand or contract which will in turn affect this lower bound. If the
number of teams increase then 1/n decreases, therefore comparing HHI levels across
different seasons can be deceiving. If the HHI is the same value for two separate seasons,
but there are a different number of teams within the league for both seasons, then the
seasons weren’t equally competitive. In order to account for this change in the lower
bound both authors use an adjusted HHI,
.
Therefore, competitive balance is measured by the deviation of HHI from the best case
scenario in any given time period. Depken shows how dHHI and the standard deviations
of wins are related, and that in fact it is not linear. His derived equation is as follows:

Standard deviation of wins (

) is positively related to dHHI, number of games played,

and number of teams in the league. It is possible for the dHHI to be effected by
exogenous factors other than just the number of teams and games played, which isn’t the
case for the standard deviation of wins. Depken controls for factors such as integration of
African American players, the expansion of new teams, and free agency.
Owen, Ryan, and Weatherston (2007) modify and critique Depken’s HHI measure
in order to account for changes in the upper bound. When n changes, then not only is the
lower bound of HHI affected, but the upper bound as well. “This occurs because teams
cannot win games in which they do not play, so that, unlike the case of firms’ market
shares, the upper bound for HHI and dHHI are less than unity” (Owen, Ryan, and
Weatherston (2007) p. 291) . Therefore, we must consider the upper bound, or the most
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unequal distribution of wins. The most unequal distribution of wins is considered to be
the situation where Team 1 wins all its games, Team 2 wins all its games except for
against Team 1, Team 3 wins all its games except for against Teams 1 and 2, and so forth
down to the last team which wins none of its games. Even with draws being a possibility
in soccer, this situation would still be the worst case scenario of balance. Experiencing
zero draws would mean that none of the teams performed equally on a given day. Owen,
Ryan and Weatherston (2007) derive the upper bounds for HHI and dHHI as follows:

and
.
The effect of expansion on these upper bounds can be seen by differentiating each term
with respect to n.

An increase in n causes a decrease in both upper bounds. In order to account for this a
normalized HHI measure must be constructed.
A normalized HHI measure allows us to compare competitive balance across time
and across leagues. The equation is as follows:
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This normalized measure lies in the interval [0,1], where 0 represents perfect parity and 1
represents the highest level of competitive imbalance. This measure will be used to
analyze competitive balance in Major League Soccer for this paper, and in turn analyze
what affects this measure. Major League Soccer has only been in play for 19 seasons
and during that time we have seen the league slowly increase from 10 teams to 19,
therefore the adjusted HHI is very much beneficial to this study.
The normalized HHI spanning from the 1996 season to the most recent 2014
season is shown in Figure 2, with the average HHI represented by the dotted line. The
league experienced consistently low levels of HHI between 2002 and 2009, with 2005 as
the exception. The league experienced a lot of variation in competitive balance during
the first half of its existence with extremely high levels in 1998, 1999, and 2001.
Beginning in 2007, the year which the designated player rule was implemented, the
change in HHI from year to year begins to be less volatile. Beginning in 2010, the
volatility of HHI is very low, but the HHI levels are above average for the remaining
seasons.
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Figure 2

MLS experienced some changes in structure during the offseason leading up to
the 2010 season. For one, the players went on strike when negotiating a new collective
bargaining agreement (the first collective bargaining agreement was established in 2004
along with MLS Players Union). Teams were now allowed to have two designated
players instead of one, and a luxury tax of $250,000 could be paid in order to acquire a
third. There were 13 designated players in the league by the end of the 2010 season,
compared to 6 at the beginning of the 2009 season.
Regression Analysis of HHI
The Model
An Ordinary Least Squares regression will be used to find relationships between
competitive balance and the explanatory variables. The model is as follows:
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The summary statistics of the variables are pictured below in Figure 3. DESIGNATED
PLAYER represents the number of DP’s during a given season. Seasons 1996-2006 take
on a value of zero because the rule wasn’t established until 2007. I expect this variable to
have a positive effect on the adjusted HHI i.e. decrease CB.
EXPANSION represents the number of teams added to the league in a given year.
The minimum value of -2 represents the 2002 season when the Miami Fusion F.C. and
the Tampa Bay Mutiny ceased operations. If the expansion draft is effective, then this
variable should have a negative coefficient, meaning an increase in CB.
NEWSTADIUMS represents the number of soccer-specific stadiums built within
the last 3 seasons. A soccer-specific stadium allows teams to better accommodate their
fans experience and may generate more revenues. There is a 2 season lag on the variable
because it takes time to acquire the new revenues and put them to good use. Therefore, I
expect NEWSTADIUMS to have a negative effect on CB.
GAMESPLAYED is the difference between the schedule length for the given
season and the previous season. The minimum value of -6 represents the 2001 season
when teams only played 26 matches. The 9/11 attack on the World Trade Centers caused
the league to suspend the regular season early. There is an increased probability of
injuries and squad rotation when teams play more games for a given season. Therefore, I
expect this GAMESPLAYED to positively affect CB. HHI’s minimum value represents
the 2004 season, meaning highest level of CB, and its maximum value represents the
1999 season.
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Figure 3
Variable
HHI
EXPANSION
DESIGNATED
NEWSTADIUMS
GAMESPLAYED

Obs.
19
19
19
19
19

Mean
Std. Dev. Min
Max
0.1337 0.07465 0.04397 0.30641
0.4737
0.9643
-2
2
8.368
12.148
0
27
2.211
1.903
0
6
-0.7368
2.13
-6
2

Results from the regression are shown in Figure 4. None of the variables have a
statistically significant effect. Therefore, the signs of the coefficients should be taken
lightly. EXPANSION’s effect is the strongest with a p-value of .101 being nearly
significant at the 10% level. The positive coefficient suggests that expanding the league
may lead to lower levels of CB. The sign of DESIGNATEDPLAYER is as expected, but
has a t-statistic of 1.03. NEWSTADIUMS may positively affect CB, which is the
opposite of what was hypothesized. GAMESPLAYED may positively affect CB as
expected, but has the lowest t-statistic of .79.

Figure 4
HHI model
coefficient
t-statistic
EXPANSION
0.0423
1.76
DESIGNATED
0.0028
1.03
NEWSTADIUMS
-0.0165
-1
GAMESPLAYED
-0.009
-0.79
CONS
0.12
3.9
R-squared
0.19

Due to the ineffectiveness of the model, a comparison of HHI levels between
MLS and another league may provide some insight. Figure 5 compares summary
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statistics between the Premier League and MLS. The average HHI level for the Premier
League is almost double for that of MLS, but MLS has a higher SD. The Premier League
is considered one of the more competitive European soccer leagues because of the
strength of teams from top to bottom. MLS has better CB on average in comparison to
the Premier League, which suggests that the league has put rules into place which
maintain parity better than European soccer.
Figure 5
MLS
1996-2014
Premier
League
1996-2014

HHI*

Average SD
Min
Max
Obs.
0.13371 0.07465 0.04397 0.30641
19

HHI*

0.25434 0.06878 0.14436 0.37141
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Suggestions for future research on CB for MLS
The model constructed for CB in MLS is not reliable because of high p-values
and a low F-statistic. The number of observations, 19, is an issue of concern. MLS has
only experienced 19 seasons, so a within-season measure of CB may be ineffective. A
within-game measure may be more efficient. Using gambling data for matches, one
could obtain the odds for a given soccer match in MLS. The odds are a representation of
the probability of one team winning or losing. A higher value of odds suggests a lower
chance of winning. Low odds values for MLS matches would suggest better parity. This
would capture the uncertainty of outcome for a given match from a fans perspective best.
Previous Research on Wage Dispersion and MLS
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Wage Dispersion
Two conflicting hypotheses on wage dispersion’s effect on an organization’s
(team) performance exist. The hierarchical pay hypothesis infers that team performance
increases along with wage dispersion. The hierarchical pay system provides incentives
for better individual performance through high wages being paid to higher talent levels
(Bloom, 1999). Then there exists the wage compression hypothesis, which predicts that
wage dispersion and team performance are inversely related to each other. High wage
differentials may cause low-wage workers’ dissatisfaction to reflect in their productivity,
thereby reducing an organization’s (team) performance (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990).
The wage compression hypothesis mostly dominates the research for wage
dispersion in sporting leagues. Depken (2000) found there to be a negative relationship
between wage dispersion and team performance in Major League Baseball. A team fixed
effects model is used with an adjusted HHI measure representing wage dispersion. San
and Jane (2008) apply Depken’s model to a small baseball league in Taiwan and also find
a negative relationship. Mondello and Maxcy (2009) study wage dispersion in the NFL
and find a conflict of objectives. Salary dispersion is negatively related to team
performance, but positively related to a team revenue production function. Meaning, a
hierarchical pay system is optimal when maximizing revenues, but a wage compression
system should be used when optimizing team performance. Frick, Prinz, and
Winkelmann (2000) find support for the hierarchical pay system in the NBA, while their
model for the NFL and MLB support the wage compression hypothesis.
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Franck and Nuesch (2011) use data from the first German soccer league to
analyze wage dispersion, and find there to be a quadratic U-shaped relation between
dispersion and team performance. Implying that German teams should either have high
levels of wage dispersion or extremely low, but to be in the middle is detrimental to team
performance. Sonntag and Sommers (2014) wrote a two page note in the International
Atlantic Economics Society journal which briefly analyzed salary dispersion in MLS.
The data used comes from the 2011 and 2012 seasons. Sonntag and Sommers find
winning percentage to be negatively affected by salary dispersion and positively affected
by average salary. The variables were found to be statistically significant for both
seasons. The findings suggest that there is a trade-off when spending lavishly on
designated players.
Relevant Research on MLS
Lawson, Sheehan, and Stephenson (2008) conducted research which analyzes
variables that have a significant effect on attendance in MLS. Games involving David
Beckham for the 2007 season saw a significant increase in attendance. Even games
where Beckham was on the bench, attendance increased significantly. This externality is
coined the term “Beckham Effect”. The “Beckham Effect” is analogous to previous
research on the NBA with superstars such as Michael Jordan and Larry Bird. Lawson,
Sheehan and Stephenson’s use the model to predict the additional revenue supplied by
Beckham to the LA Galaxy via ticket sales. They found that Beckham generated
approximately twice as much revenue compared to his annual salary.

20

Kuethe and Motamed (2010) analyzed how being a superstar effects wages within
MLS. The structure of MLS allows for two easy routes to determine whether a player is
of superstar status: the DP rule and the All-Star Game. Studies of the “superstar effect”
in European football has used the number of Google hits to determine the whether players
are considered superstars (Lehmann and Schulze, 2005; Franck and Nuesch, 2006).
Kuethe and Motamed us an OLS regression model and the results suggest a 928% wage
premium for designated players. A quantile regression is also constructed with results
suggesting different performance elasticities for different quantiles. Meaning, nonsuperstars receive less compensation than superstars when both experience an equal
increase in performance. This may stifle performance incentives for players at the lower
end of the wage bill.
The relationship between wage and age in Kuethe and Motamed’s model is the
opposite of that found in most sporting leagues. Lucifora and Simmons (2003) found
there to be a concave relationship between wages and age in Italian soccer, but MLS
exhibits a convex relationship. The strategy of MLS’ DP rule explains this contrasting
relationship. Older superstars whom are past their prime come to MLS in order to
maximize their earning potential on the cusps of retirement.

Player Salaries in Major League Soccer
Introduction
In April 2003, the Major League Soccer Players Union was formed and acts as the
exclusive collective bargaining representative for all players in MLS. Each team in the
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league has a player representative which is elected by the team. Collective Bargaining
Agreements were agreed upon by the Union and MLS in 2004, 2010, and 2015. The
Union has an archive of player salaries beginning in the 2007 season. This salary data is
extremely beneficial for Economists and the availability is somewhat unique. In
European soccer leagues player salary information isn’t always easily obtained, and
player Unions do not exist.
Wage dispersion among players in MLS is an area of controversy. The Player’s
Union went on strike just before the start of the 2015 season, arguing that non-superstar
players deserve more pay. If lower income players feel that they should be making more
money while Designated Players are making a substantially higher amount, then how
does this affect team performance? Soccer players must be in sync with each other in
order to execute the passing and defending necessary to compete on the highest level.
Attackers and midfielders must know where their teammates will be and trust their
teammates when executing no look passes, quick one-two passes, through balls, etc.
Defenders need to hold a tight line in order to prevent an opposing attacker from
receiving a dangerous through ball.
Granted, there are moments of individual brilliance in soccer. An attacker may
“knife” through the opposing team starting at the 40 yard mark and then have only the
Goalkeeper to beat, but these moments are outliers. Attacking play should be sustained
through effective team work in order to be successful throughout an entire season. If
some of the players on the squad resent the salary received by their teammates then the
mental cohesiveness among the squad may be affected. The introduction and growth of
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the Designated Player Rule is causing high variation in salaries. We want to understand
how this dispersion is affecting team performance.
Data
The data used for this section originates from the MLS Players Union website,
spanning the 2007-2014 seasons (Player Salary Information n.d.). Listed below in Figure
6 are the year to year descriptive statistics of the guaranteed compensation salaries. All
salary numbers are adjusted for inflation with 2007 as the base year. Guaranteed
compensation salaries include a player’s base salary, all signing bonuses and guaranteed
bonuses annualized over the term of the contract. “The value also includes any annual
marketing bonus to be received in the current year and any agent’s fees annualized over
the term of the contract but does not include performance bonuses” (Kuethe and
Motamed 2010, 569). The salary cap for each year is also shown because it has a direct
effect on the average salaries. Salary cap numbers were found on Wikipedia under “The
Designated Player Rule” entry.
Figure 6
Year
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014

Average
$113,810.40
$112,239.13
$130,971.39
$164,580.67
$146,089.49
$150,149.32
$148,769.56
$181,495.58

SD
Max
$385,422.05 $6,500,000.00
$372,922.95 $6,256,015.40
$385,219.88 $6,280,800.08
$532,641.06 $6,179,294.61
$474,665.86 $5,990,783.41
$423,477.24 $5,054,151.62
$349,694.27 $3,870,106.76
$608,843.24 $5,862,687.39

Min
Salary Cap
# of DP's
$12,900.00
$2,100,000
5
$12,415.78
$2,300,000
6
$19,422.17
N/A
7
$29,717.65
$2,550,000
13
$30,046.08
$2,667,500
22
$30,460.29
$2,811,375
21
$31,250.00
$2,951,944
19
$31,961.47
$3,099,541
27

The average salary for MLS players does not experience an annual increase in all
seasons, but has seen an overall increase from $113,810.4 in 2007 to $181,495.58,
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adjusted for inflation, in 2014. There was a large spike in average salary during the 2010
season, from $130,971.39 to $164,580.67. The DP rule changed preceding the 2010
season: teams could now sign two designated players as compared to one. Yet, the
average salary of the league decreased the following season and hovered around
$150,000 until it increased to $181,495.58 in 2014. The 2010 and 2014 World Cup
Tournaments may have had an impact on average salaries across the league for the
respective seasons. American’s interest in soccer peaks during the World Cup which
could cause an influx of Designated Players. Also, players who performed well during
the Cup may request higher salaries.
The standard deviation (SD) of salaries from year to year moves in the same
direction as the average salary with a correlation coefficient of .82, which is consistent
with what is an expected effect of the DP rule. Superstars are brought into the league
with substantial higher salaries than the rest of the players, causing the average salary and
SD to increase together. The maximum salary from 2007-2011 was David Beckham at
$6.5 million (nominal). In 2012 and 2013 Thierry Henry had the highest salary, while in
2014 Clint Dempsey had the highest salary of $6.7 million (nominal). The minimum
value for each season represents the minimum salary required by the rules of MLS and
agreed upon during Collective Bargaining Agreements between MLS and the Union.
The minimum salary has increased or stayed the same every year since 2007. The
minimum value of $12,900 for the 2007 season seems low for a professional athlete in a
first division league. If MLS soccer players were assumed to work 40 hours per week
throughout the year, then that salary is equivalent to $6.20/hour. The MLS season lasts
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about 8 months, so if a player only worked during this time span then the minimum
salary would be equivalent to $10/hour. All this to say, that a salary of $12,900 for a
professional athlete in the same league as David Beckham shows a high level of
disparity.
Gini Coefficient
The Gini coefficient is a widely used measure of income inequality in the field of
Economics, and is used in previous literature on the subject of Sports Economics (Frank
and Nuesch, 2010; Sonntag and Sommers, 2014). To understand the Gini coefficient one
must understand the Lorenz curve. Pictured below in Figure 7 is the graphical
representation of the Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient (Linehard 2011).
Figure 7

The Lorenz curve represents the cumulative distribution of income for a given
population. If all agents within a given population have an equal share, then the Lorenz

25

curve will simply be a straight line that is represented by the equation y=x. If income is
unequally distributed, then the Lorenz curve will lie below the line of perfect equality.
The Gini coefficient is simply the ratio of the area between the line of perfect equality
and the Lorenz curve over the area under the perfect line of equality. When looking at
the picture above the Gini coefficient is represented as A/(A+B) where A+B= .5.
Therefore, a Gini coefficient with a value of 1 represents complete inequality where one
person has all of the income, while a value of 0 represents income of the population being
perfectly distributed.
Regression Analysis of Wage Dispersion Stage 1
Starting with Sonntag and Sommers (2014) model and building upon it, a more
accurate and appropriate model will be constructed for wage dispersion’s effect on team
performance. Their points percentage variable is coded differently than the standard
point system used by MLS and all major Professional soccer leagues. Losses, ties, and
wins were coded 0, .5, and 1, respectively. The standard point system has ties receiving 1
point and wins receiving 3 points which places more weight on a win. The differences in
the point systems will cause the regression results to differ. The standard point system
will be used for construction of the model for this study because it represents the actual
system used by MLS. The natural log of average team salary was used as an explanatory
variable by Sonntag and Sommers, but using a ratio of average team salary over average
league salary for the given year (adjusted for inflation) allows for a better measurement
and understanding of salary levels. The model is as follows:
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The salary of a player is closely remunerated by their ability/talent. Therefore, the
AVERAGERATIO reflects the team’s total talent in comparison to the rest of the league.
Previous studies on wage dispersion (Frank and Nuesch, 2011; Depken, 2000) control for
total salary in their models, but average salary is more useful for MLS due to the high
variation in the number of players on each team. The maximum number of roster slots is
usually 31, but most teams do not fill all these spots.
A negative coefficient estimate on GINI is expected and would imply that while
holding average salary constant, large salary dispersion negatively effects performance.
A positive coefficient estimate on AVERAGERATIO is expected, suggesting that
players’ salaries reflect their ability to perform. The results from the OLS regression are
shown in Figure 8.
Figure 8

Points Percentage Model
Explanatory Variables
coefficient t-statistic
GINI
-0.1673
-1.47
AVERAGERATIO
0.0611
2.3
CONS
0.4754
12.73
R-squared
0.0443

The signs of the estimated coefficients are as expected with AVERAGERATIO being
statistically significant. The insignificance of GINI could be attributed to omitted
variable bias, which is a concern of any regression model.
A simple scatter plot between the dependent variable and the explanatory variable
of interest can show the relation between the two in the simplest way. A two-way scatter
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plot is pictured below in Figure 9. The Gini coefficient and points may have a quadratic
relationship which is analogous to the case of the first German soccer league (Frank and
Nuesch, 2010).
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Therefore, a new OLS regression may be of use:

The results of this regression are as follows:
Figure 10

Points Percentage Model
Explanatory Variables
coefficient t-statistic
GINI
-0.5665
-0.9
GINI^2
0.4137
0.65
AVERAGERATIO
0.0442
1.19
CONS
0.5798
3.5
R-squared
0.047
None of the variables in this regression are significant. Figure 11 shows the same
regression, except AVERAGERATIO is dropped. The GINI and its quadratic term are
both significant at the 10% level. When comparing the models in figures 8, 10, and 11, it
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seems that either GINI^2 or AVERAGERATIO should be included, but not both. Other
explanatory variables will be introduced to the model and then a decision will be made on
whether to keep the GINI^2 or AVERAGERATIO term. By controlling for other
variables which have an effect on team performance we may have a better chance of
understanding the relationship between salary dispersion and team performance.
Figure 11
Points Percentage Model
Explanatory Variables
GINI
GINI^2
CONS
R-squared

coefficient t-statistic
-0.9955
-1.94
0.943
2.06
0.696
5.21
0.037

Control Variables for Wage Dispersion Model
Coach Experience
A good coach is vital to the performance of a team in any sport. Therefore,
controlling for the coaching quality will allow us to better understand the effect of salary
dispersion on team performance. Previous coaching experience in MLS will be used as a
metric for coaching experience. Overall coaching experience isn’t used because there
were several internationally successful coaches which came to MLS and performed
poorly. Years of coaching the United States Men’s National Team (USMNT) and
previous MLS teams will represent experience. Bruce Arena coached the USMNT from
1998-2006 and during that period most team members were MLS players, so those years
of coaching should be considered valuable experience. Also, any years as an assistant
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coach for an MLS team or the USMNT will be counted as experience. Any year in which
a coach was fired during the middle of the season and an interim coach was hired, will
receive a value of 0.
The summary statistics and frequency table of coaching experience throughout the
sample are pictured below in Figure 12. The average is 5.5 years with a standard
deviation of 5.2 years. 21% of the observations have a value of 0, meaning no coaching
experience or a coach was fired during the season. The value increases from year to year
as the coach obtains years of experience. Bruce Arena has 21 years of experience by the
end of the sample, the most in the league. He began coaching the LA Galaxy in 2009
with 16 years of experience, and he has been in Los Angeles ever since.
Figure 12

Variable
COACHEXPERIENCE

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.
5.504

133

30

5.2

Min

Max
0

21

COACHEXPERIENCE

Freq.

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

28
11
14
8
7
7
7
6
8
9
7
4
3
3
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
133

Percent
Cum.
0.2105
0.2105
0.0827
0.2932
0.1053
0.3985
0.0602
0.4586
0.0526
0.5113
0.0526
0.5639
0.0526
0.6165
0.0451
0.6617
0.0602
0.7218
0.0677
0.7895
0.0526
0.8421
0.0301
0.8722
0.0226
0.8947
0.0226
0.9173
0.0075
0.9248
0.0150
0.9398
0.0150
0.9549
0.0150
0.9699
0.0075
0.9774
0.0075
0.9850
0.0075
0.9925
0.0075
1.0000
1

Newly added teams
Teams which are new to the league may experience a difficult time being
immediately successful in the league, therefore, will be controlled for. The NEWTEAM
variable is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 for a team’s first and second year
of play in the league. The second year of play was included because it seems reasonable
that it may take more than one season for an expansion team to adjust. Even if newly
added teams employ some superstars it is extremely difficult to jump into a league and be
successful. The Seattle Sounders were the only team which achieved immediate success
when joining the league in 2009, while finishing in 4th place. A frequency table of the
variable is shown in Figure 13.
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Figure 13

NEWTEAM
0
1
Total

Freq.
119
14
133

Percent
89.47
10.53
100

Cum.
89.47
100

Western Conference vs. Eastern Conference
Major League Soccer is divided into two conferences: Eastern and Western.
There have been no assertions, to my knowledge, as to which conference is more or less
difficult to compete in than the other. There is undoubtedly a difference between the
Eastern and Western conference, but is the difference significant? The model will give
some insight to this question.
Regression Analysis of Wage Dispersion Stage 2
Two models will be constructed and compared. Model 1 includes a quadratic
GINI term and no AVERAGERATIO term. Model 2 excludes the quadratic GINI term,
while including AVERAGERATIO.
(1)

(2)

The expected sign of the variables have already been discussed. The only variables in
which the summary statistics have not been shown are GINI and AVERAGERATIO.
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The summary statistics are pictured below in Figure 14. The minimum GINI value
belongs to Chivas USA for 2013, while the largest value belongs to LA Galaxy for the
2008 season. The lowest AVERAGERATIO value belongs to Chivas for 2010, while the
largest belongs to the NY Red Bulls for 2010.
Figure 14
Variable
Obs.
AVERAGERATIO
GINI

Mean
133
133

1.007
0.492

Std. Dev. Min
Max
0.624
0.511 3.232
0.146
0.267 0.845

The results of the first regression are shown below:
Figure 15
Model 1
Points_P
Coefficient t-statistic
GINI
-0.8324
-1.74
GINI^2
0.7313
1.71
COACHEXPERIENCE
0.008
4.86
WESTCOAST
0.0093
0.56
NEWTEAM
-0.045
-1.72
CONS
0.6286
5
R-squared
0.21

GINI and GINI^2 are significant at the 10% level. The model suggests that higher levels
of salary dispersion negatively effects team performance, until a certain cut-off point
where increasing dispersion results in better team performance. In order to solve for that
cut-off point the following equation must be calculated:
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The cut-off point for the model is approximately .57. There are 34 teams in the sample
with a Gini larger than .57. These 34 teams would see an increase in team performance
by increasing salary dispersion levels, i.e. employing mores superstars.
COACHEXPERIENCE is statistically significant at the 5% level and has a
positive sign as expected. NEWTEAM is statistically significant at the 10% level with a
negative coefficient estimate. WEST is not significant, but
The results from the second model are as shown in Figure 16:
Figure 16
Model 2
Points_P
Coefficient t-statistic
GINI
-0.2216
-2.09
AVERAGERATIO
0.0558
2.27
COACHEXPERIENCE
0.0081
4.99
WESTCOAST
0.0103
0.63
NEWTEAM
-0.0435
-1.68
CONS
0.4629
12.97
R-squared
0.2206

GINI is significant at the 5% level with a negative effect, implying wage dispersion
negatively effects team performance. The AVERAGERATIO is significant at the 5%
level with a positive effect on team performance. COACHEXPERIENCE, WEST, and
NEWTEAM have the same signs in both models and their magnitudes are almost
identical. Model 2 states that salary dispersion negatively affects team performance, but
by increasing the AVERAGERATIO, the team can counteract the negative effect of
dispersion. If GINI increases by one standard deviation then point percentage decreases
by .033, but if AVERAGERATIO increases by one SD then point percentage increases
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by .035. The tradeoff between the two variables is essentially equal when experiencing a
one SD change 2.
Discussion on Salary Dispersion in MLS
Models 1 and 2 tell the same story: teams in the lower tail of the wage disparity
distribution (low Gini coefficients) in MLS improve team performance, but signing
superstars via the DP rule increases team performance (wins) with the inevitable tradeoff
of increasing wage dispersion (losses). Teams cannot have a significantly large average
salary without increasing wage dispersion. AVERAGERATIO and GINI^2 from Models
1 and 2, respectively, capture the same information with a positive coefficient estimate.
The salary dispersion situation in MLS is different than European soccer leagues because
of rules such as the salary cap, maximum salary limitation on non-DP’s, and limited
number of DP’s per team. There are no such wage restrictions in European soccer.
Therefore, European teams can have high average salaries while obtaining low levels of
salary dispersion.
Model 1 supports both the hierarchal pay hypothesis and wage compression
hypothesis, depending on where the team lies relative to the cut-off point mentioned.
Model 2 supports the wage compression hypothesis which, intuitively, seems accurate
due to the team chemistry involved in gameplay. Model 2 represents the salary
dispersion trade-off in MLS more accurately than Model 1. The positive effect of having

2

GINI coefficients for all non-DP’s on a team were calculated and regressed on points percentage and was
not found to be statistically significant. DP’s share of total salary for teams was calculated and regressed
as well and was also found to not have significance.
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high average salaries and increasing a team’s talent level is important and is better
captured by the AVERAGERATIO variable as compared to the GINI^2 variable.
Conclusion
MLS is a sporting league ripe with research opportunity and lacking in previous
research. Competitive balance is an area of importance in the sporting industry dating
back to 1956 (Rottenberg) and is of major concern for management due to its
implications on revenue streams and profits. Understanding variables which have a
negative or positive effect on competitive balance is important in obtaining viewers and
fans.
This study failed to provide conclusive evidence on the DP rule’s effect on CB,
but the model constructed suggests the possibility of a negative relation. The withinseason measure used restricts the number of observations due to MLS’s short existence.
A within-game measure is proposed for future researchers, specifically, the distribution
of match odds provided by gambling data. This measure can provide a higher number of
observations and an interesting view on parity from the fan’s perspective.
The DP rule has caused salary dispersion levels to rise. The effect of wage
disparity on an organization’s performance is a common issue addressed by Economists
in industries besides sports. The two contradicting hypothesis, wage compression and
hierarchal pay, have been supported in different studies across different industries. The
wage compression hypothesis is applicable to wage structure in MLS according to the
model 2’s results in Figure 16. Soccer requires high levels of team chemistry considering
the amount of passing and communication needed to be effective as a unit. Teams in
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MLS should keep salary disparity levels at a minimum, but should also increase average
salaries in order to acquire better talent. Because of the structure of MLS and its DP rule,
teams cannot increase average salaries without inevitably increasing wage dispersion. As
more DP’s are allowed to enter the league and minimum salary requirements increase,
wage dispersion levels will begin decreasing. In turn, allowing teams to handle the
tradeoff between dispersion and average salaries more effectively.
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